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2015 saw a drop in Belarus’s GDP for the first time in almost 20 years, which is primarily the result 
of a significant reduction in levels of production and export. As a consequence, there was also 
a serious depletion of the country’s foreign exchange reserves, as well as a progressive weakening 
of the Belarusian rouble. The macroeconomic figures from January and February 2016 show that 
these trends are not only continuing, but they are also becoming even more severe, which con-
firms that Belarus now finds itself in a prolonged economic crisis. On one hand, the reason for this 
state of affairs is the protracted economic recession in Russia, which is Belarus’s main economic 
partner, together with the drastic global decline in prices for fuel, which is a key Belarusian export. 
On the other hand, meanwhile, an equally important reason for the current crisis is the failure of 
the Belarusian economic model. President Aleksandr Lukashenko, out of fear that his authorita-
rian system of government will be dismantled and that public discontent will rise, has categorical-
ly rejected the proposals for even partial reforms put forward by some of his entourage, who are 
aware of the need for the immediate transformation of the country’s anachronistic and very costly 
economic model, based as it still is on quasi-Soviet management policies. 
In this situation the Belarusian authorities have adopted a familiar tactic in order to obtain large, 
low-interest stabilisation loans, principally from the International Monetary Fund and the Russian-
controlled Eurasian Stabilisation and Development Fund. In the context of Minsk’s new opening in 
its relations with the EU, a possible thaw with Washington, and its close cooperation with Russia, 
it seems quite probable that it will obtain financial support. And despite the fact that these two 
institutions, in particular the IMF, have demanded reforms, we should not expect Minsk to bow to 
their pressure and undertake a comprehensive reconstruction of its inefficient economic system. 
Lukashenko’s current policy of survival based on loans is only postponing the inevitable reforms, 
while further increasing their social and financial costs when they arrive. 
Symptoms of the crisis
In the past year Belarus’s GDP has decreased 
by 3.9%, which means the end of the country’s 
19-year trend of growth. One of the main rea-
sons for this is certainly the significant drop in 
Belarusian exports, which make up more than 
half of GDP. In 2015, the value of exports from 
Belarus amounted to US$26.6 billion, which is 
up to US$9.3 billion (26%) less than the previ-
ous year. This was accompanied by a decrease 
in imports of US$10.1 billion (25%). However, 
this did not affect the downward trend in Be-
larusian foreign trade, which has been continu-
ing for many years, and last year also closed 
with a negative balance of US$-3.6 billion. It is 
worth noting that the largest drop in exports 
(30%) was to the markets of the CIS countries, 
and in the case of exports to Russia (which re-
mains the main trading partner for Belarus), 
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this meant a loss of US$4.7 billion in potential 
income1. This is a result of the deep econom-
ic recession in Russia, as well as in other post 
-Soviet markets important for Belarus (mostly 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan). Also subject to eco-
nomic downturn (although to a lesser extent 
than Russia) was the goods trade with the EU; 
the sales value of Belarusian goods to the EU 
fell by 19%, slightly more than US$2 billion.
This significant reduction of income in foreign 
currency from exports, combined with the 
need to repay US$3.6 billion of foreign debt in 
2015, has resulted in a drop in the Central Bank 
of Belarus’s currency reserves of over US$800 
million throughout the year. So as of 1 Janu-
ary this year their level stood at only US$4.175 
billion, which is insufficient to cover the val-
ue of three months of Belarusian imports, the 
level normally considered safe for a state’s fi-
nances. All indications are that the above-men-
tioned trends will worsen this year, as GDP 
has already dropped by 4.3% this January, the 
monthly balance of foreign trade amounted to 
US$-50 million (while in the same month last 
year it amounted to almost US$+180 million), 
and the level of foreign exchange reserves 
during the first two months of this year fell by 
almost US$65 million. At the same time, in ac-
cordance with its schedule for repaying foreign 
debt, Belarus should repay US$3.3 billion to its 
1 The last decline in GDP was recorded in 1995, when 
Belarus was in a deep economic slump caused by the 
breakup of the Soviet Union and the loss of most of its 
cooperative links with the other Union Republics, and 
of funds from the central budget in Moscow. President 
Lukashenko’s path towards reintegration with Russia, 
initiated in the mid-1990s, has brought lasting economic 
stability, which for many years was one of the regime’s 
propaganda strengths.
creditors (primarily Russia and China) this year, 
which with such a critical (and still falling) level 
of reserves is already virtually impossible2. 
The economic downturns in Russia and other 
markets important for Belarusian exports have 
also led to a serious deterioration in the health 
of Belarusian industrial companies, which for the 
most part are still based on Soviet infrastructure 
and management principles, and so are less com-
petitive. According to official statistics, in 2015 
up to 60% of Belarusian enterprises had reported 
losses, or at most minimal profits; compared with 
2014 the number of such businesses had risen by 
24%3. This was accompanied by a drastic decline 
in revenues in the manufacturing sector, of up to 
42.2%. It should be noted that this group also in-
cluded entities of considerable importance for the 
Belarusian economy, such as MTZ (tractors), MAZ 
(trucks) and BMZ (engine production for heavy 
vehicles), all based in the capital, and the agricul-
tural machinery production plant Gomselmash, 
located in Gomel. Among the biggest so-called 
strategic companies still turning a profit is the po-
tassium company Bielkaliy, and two oil refineries.
Another important aspect of the crisis in the 
Belarusian economy is the depreciation of the 
Belarusian rouble, which has been ongoing for 
many months. Over the last year, its value in re-
lation to the so-called basket of currencies (the 
US dollar, the euro and the Russian rouble) de-
creased by 37.8%, and in relation to the dollar 
alone it fell by 55.9%. In the first few weeks of 
2016 there has been a further decrease of at 
2 In assessing the state of the Belarusian currency re-
serves, it should be borne in mind the fact that some of 
them are collected in gold, precious stones and units of 
account from the IMF (so-called SDRs) that can only be 
used in exceptional cases. According to expert assess-
ments, the Belarusian central bank may have as little as 
US$2.2 billion in liquid cash available for transactions 
and interventions on the market.
3 In statistics concerning the situation of businesses in 
Belarus, only one indicator has improved: the level of 
stocks of finished products in relation to monthly pro-
duction. The annual average in 2015 was 68%, com-
pared to to 75% in 2014. This is above all a result of the 
decline in industrial production, related to the reduction 
in the work week for factory personnel, and in any case 
is not a symptom of positive trends in the industry.
Much seems to indicate that, even 
last year, some members of President 
Lukashenko’s circle had begun to sense 
the seriousness of the situation and the 
consequent need for change.
3OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 202
least twelve percent4. This significant weaken-
ing of the rouble has led to a decline in the real 
value of wages; whereas the changes were not 
so drastic in 2015, the dynamic fall of the rou-
ble rate in January this year when calculated in 
dollars has reduced the amount of the average 
salary by almost US$90 (to US$315). For that part 
of Belarusian society which keeps its savings in 
foreign currencies and goes shopping to the 
neighbouring countries of Poland and Lithuania, 
this has led to a clear decline in their standard of 
living. Meanwhile, the whole of society has long 
been affected by the rise in commodity prices in 
the stores, which has made Belarus one of the 
most expensive countries in the world5. 
The government’s dogmatic policies
Much seems to indicate that, even last year, 
some members of President Lukashenko’s cir-
cle had begun to sense the seriousness of the 
situation and the consequent need for change. 
The President’s economic adviser, Kiril Rudy, has 
come out as the main promoter of reforms; in 
October 2015 he publicly spoke in favour of a de-
parture from the traditional command-and-pol-
icy distribution system based on ‘manual con-
trol’ and regulating development by drawing up 
specific plans to be implemented6. Moreover, he 
4 To illustrate the scale of this process, it is worth men-
tioning that at the beginning of 2015 €1 bought 14,380 
Belarusian roubles and US$1 11,850 Belarusian roubles, 
while on 4 March the rates were 23,210 and 21,356 Be-
larusian roubles respectively. In connection with this, 
the Belarusian press has long carried ironic comments 
on the ‘country of millionaires’, and the authorities final-
ly took the decision (which had already been postponed 
for several years) to redenominate the rouble as of 1 July 
this year, to lower the rates and facilitate trade.
5 Earlier this year the popular newspaper Komsomolskaya 
Pravda v Belarusi conducted an experiment that com-
pared purchases of the same products in the capitals of 
several European states, including Belarus. As a result, 
it turned out that shopping in Minsk was more expen-
sive, not only than in Warsaw or Kiev, but even Moscow, 
which has hitherto had a reputation for high prices. In 
turn, according to a ranking by the American magazine 
Time, the cost of living in Belarus turned out to be higher 
than for example in Poland, Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Spain, 
Russia, Portugal and Croatia.
6 For more see http://ej.by/news/economy/2015/10/24/kirill 
-rudyy-protiv-ruchnogo-upravleniya-ekonomikoy.html
also stressed the need for a broad programme 
of privatisation and the elimination of unprof-
itable enterprises, which was already a very 
far-reaching idea in the context of the Belarusian 
authorities’ clearly anti-liberal economic policy. 
However, in another statement made a few 
weeks later at the Economic Forum in Minsk, 
Rudy admitted that such reforms were not so es-
sential, and that there was a lack both of public 
demand for them and of administrative person-
nel able to draw up and implement such system-
ic changes to the economy7. All indications are 
that the President’s advisor was forced to pub-
licly withdraw his proposal, and thus he cannot 
be said to have any significant influence on the 
evolution of the country’s economic policy8. 
In his own statements over the last few months, 
President Lukashenko has firmly reiterated his 
thesis – as encountered in his rhetoric for many 
years – that he would not permit any reforms 
which would in his opinion only bring “con-
fusion among citizens, thus destabilising the 
situation”, and could “cost considerably more 
than repaying the current foreign debt”. At the 
same time, the Belarusian leader has spoken 
openly in favour of economic ‘manual control’, 
including by granting specific support to un-
7 For more see http://news.tut.by/economics/471159.html
8 It is worth mentioning that, although Rudy is still in 
his post, he now presents his still-liberal positions in 
a manner more reminiscent of a scientist-expert, as 
for example in the form of his recently published book 
Финансовая диета [A financial diet], containing com-
prehensive recommendations for economic reforms in 
Belarus; http://naviny.by/rubrics/economic/2016/02/05/
ic_articles_113_190915/ It seems that his presence in 
President Lukashenko’s inner circle is intended to be an 
asset in Minsk’s discussions with international financial 
institutions expecting economic reforms, such as the 
IMF, the European Investment Bank and the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
Lukashenko has acknowledged that any 
deep changes in the current economic 
model could weaken his entire autocrat-
ic system of government, and could even 
cause an outburst of public unrest.
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profitable companies threatened with bank-
ruptcy9. As in previous years, Lukashenko has 
declared that any deeper changes to the cur-
rent economic model could undermine the en-
tire authoritarian system of power, and even 
the outbreak of social discontent. The Belaru-
sian president has tried to retain at least some 
elements of social guarantees, including above 
all a high level of employment in state industry. 
On the one hand, this eases public sentiment, 
and on the other hand – through a system of 
short-term contracts, extended every few years 
– it allows control over a significant part of Be-
larusian society. While avoiding the elimination 
of unprofitable businesses, the Belarusian au-
thorities also take a cautious approach to the 
issue of privatisation. In the privatisation plan 
for 2016 announced this January, only 56 com-
panies were included, and in most cases only 
smaller share packages were to be offered for 
sale. There were no companies of strategic im-
portance on the list, and the planned total in-
come from all the transactions is only expect-
ed to reach around US$20 million. It can thus 
be concluded that not only is the Belarusian 
government not ready to reform the economy 
through privatisation, but it also does not see 
this method as an effective source of income to 
supplement its dwindling currency reserves10.
9 For more see http://naviny.by/rubrics/politic/2016/01/26/
ic_articles_112_190823/
10 This approach is probably also conditioned by a lack of 
interest from potential investors, who fear that the costs 
of acquiring obsolete industrial infrastructure requiring 
costly modernisation will be too high. Moreover Russia, 
which has for many years been committed to taking over 
key assets in Belarusian industry, has temporarily eased its 
pressure on Minsk due to the current recession. However, 
it cannot be ruled out that privatisation in Belarus will once 
again become a priority for Moscow in the next few years.
The Belarusian authorities’ dogmatic economic 
policy also translates to the unrealistic structure 
of the state budget. The income and expenditure 
plan for 2016 is still based on the assumption 
that the oil price will remain at US$50 per barrel; 
and contrary to initial announcements that the 
budget would be revised, there has been no ac-
tion in this direction. Although Belarus itself has 
no significant oil deposits (annual national ex-
traction amounts to about 1.5 million tons), the 
country has two refineries with a total capacity 
of over 20 million tonnes per year (producing 
mainly for export), and so the Belarusian econ-
omy is greatly dependent on the state of the oil 
market11. Belarus imports crude oil according 
to fixed rates agreed with Russia; its petroleum 
products must then compete on the European 
market in a situation of economic downturn, 
which means a reduction in the profit margin for 
Belarus. The share of oil products in Belarusian 
exports is almost 30%, making the sector one 
of the key pillars of the Belarusian state budget. 
Another important element for Belarus’s financ-
es is the revenue from export duties on Belaru-
sian petroleum products made from oil import-
ed from Russia. The scheduled proceeds of 
US$1.1 billion for this year were crucial to signing 
off the budget in the black. However, in the face 
of a significant drop in oil prices, this inadequate 
budget will further deteriorate the condition of 
the state’s finances. 
In this situation, the necessary reforms have 
once again been blocked and postponed, and 
the overall economic policy is being subordinat-
ed to the political strategy of maintaining social 
order and the full power of the state, regard-
less of the real condition of the economy. At the 
same time, however, wherever the authorities 
have had to reduce the social package due to 
a lack of resources, Lukashenko has publicly 
chastised his subordinates for going too far, thus 
11 According to Bloomberg’s ranking published at the begin-
ning of 2014, Belarus was the world’s third most dependent 
country on oil revenue. In the authors’ opinion, the value of 
export of Belarusian oil products in 2018 will rise to 13.9% 
of GDP (currently the figure stands at around 12-13%). For 
more see http://bdg.by/news/economics/27821.html
The reforms proposed by the government 
are another attempt at “commanding 
growth” according to the traditional princi-
ples of the command economy which Minsk 
has hitherto preferred to apply.
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presenting himself in the role of the defender of 
‘the ordinary people’. The most conspicuous ex-
ample of such a superficial action is Lukashen-
ko’s reaction to the significant increases (from 
40% to 70%) in municipal charges this January, 
which resulted from the agreements during ne-
gotiations with the IMF on a new credit line12. 
On 22 February, during his regular discussions 
with the cabinet, Lukashenko harshly criticised 
the “inadequate” increases, recommended that 
the charges be reassessed, and that the guilty 
officials be punished. As a result, the State Con-
trol Committee (SCC) opened up 22 criminal 
proceedings against employees in the housing 
sector on charges of ‘abusing official powers’. 
In addition, the authorities are taking decisions 
which are presented as reform measures, but in 
fact are all about improving their public image. 
On 23 February, President Lukashenko signed 
a decree ‘on efforts to improve the efficiency of 
the socio-economic sector’. Among the other 
measures proposed, state-owned enterprises 
have been obliged to reduce production costs 
by 25% and attract foreign capital; and the 
central government, together with the admin-
istrations of individual regions, are to work on 
increasing the number of new jobs. Another im-
portant aspect of these reforms is an addition-
al aid package for the poorest social groups. 
However, this comprehensive document is not 
a package of bold and comprehensive reforms, 
12 Currently, the public covers only about 30% of the 
charges for gas, electricity, water, heating, rubbish col-
lection and other municipal charges. The IMF, like the 
Eurasian Stabilisation and Development Fund, has made 
opening a new line of credit for Belarus dependent on 
the state ceasing to subsidise these fees.
but rather another attempt at “commanding 
growth” according to the traditional principles 
of the command economy which Minsk has 
hitherto preferred to apply. 
Hanging on for a loan
Regardless of his pro-social economic propaganda 
and the imitation of genuine reforms, Lukashenko 
is aware of the real scale of Belarus’s macro-eco-
nomic problems, primarily the likely collapse of 
the state’s finances. Bearing in mind his priority 
of retaining full power in the country, he has 
chosen the safest tactics (from his point of 
view), namely raising large, low-interest stabili-
sation loans from the IMF (US$3 billion) and the 
Eurasian Stabilisation and Development Fund 
(US$2 billion). In connection with this, Minsk 
had already made efforts to win favour in both 
institutions last year, taking advantage of the fa-
vourable context to hold talks with the EU after 
the relatively benign course of the presidential 
elections in Belarus last October, as well as the 
conciliatory role of Belarusian diplomacy in the 
Russian-Ukrainian conflict. After the abolition on 
15 February this year of EU visa and economic 
sanctions, Belarus’s chances of obtaining a cred-
it line from the IMF increased significantly, and 
a day later President Lukashenko publicly ad-
mitted that his government should move away 
from the policy of socially painful budget cuts, 
because “the situation after the EU’S decision is 
now different”13. Next, the IMF itself sent a pos-
itive signal to Minsk by doubling the country’s 
credit limit, which in practice means Belarus can 
now apply for a maximum of US$4 billion14. Cur-
rently Minsk is conducting detailed negotiations 
on the conditions for an IMF stabilisation pro-
gramme for Belarus, which will certainly include 
the controversial issues mentioned above of state 
subsidies for municipal charges, the support of 
13 For more, see http://www.belta.by/president/view/lu-
kashenko-pravitelstvu-rezat-po-zhivomu-ljudej-otbira-
ja-poslednie-dengi-nikomu-ne-pozvoleno-181831-2016/
14 This was the first modification to Belarus’s participation 
in the IMF since 1999.
The loans from the IMF and the Eurasian 
Fund will only be an ad hoc boost to Belar-
us’s inefficient and very costly economic 
model, which is increasingly lagging be-
hind the changing international context.
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unprofitable enterprises, and privatisation. The 
interest rate on this loan may amount to 2.28%, 
although Belarus is hoping (despite this already 
low rate) that it will be reduced further to 2.1%. 
Simultaneously, Minsk is holding talks with Mos-
cow on obtaining a loan from the Russian-con-
trolled Eurasian Stabilisation and Development 
Fund. Although the Fund has formally set mac-
ro-economic conditions similar to the demands 
of the IMF15, a political understanding between 
Belarus and Russia will be crucially important. 
As in the case of the negotiations with the IMF, 
a final decision is still lacking; however, all indi-
cations are that over the next few weeks, Belarus 
will receive support in the planned amount of 
US$2 billion, most likely without even having to 
make any concessions, such as the deployment 
of an important air base in Bobruisk, which is 
important to the Kremlin16. It seems that it will 
be enough for Russia to weaken Minsk’s interest 
in reopening relations with the EU. In this way, 
by expertly handling the situation in the region 
and Minsk’s relations with the West and Russia, 
Aleksandr Lukashenko has been able to realise 
his plan of short-term survival by increasing his 
country’s foreign debt. 
15 The ESDF places special emphasis on three issues: reduc-
ing the ratio of wage raises to inflation, the introduction 
of municipal fees, and removing limits on the prices of 
goods and services.
16 On 26 February Aleksandr Surikov, the Ambassador of the 
Russian Federation to the Republic of Belarus, claimed in an 
interview for Belarusian TV that the final decision to grant 
Belarus a loan from the ESDF Belarusian of US$2 billion 
had already been taken, and its implementation was “only 
a matter of time”. According to analysts from the Russian 
consulting firm WTB Kapital, the first tranche of US$1.1 bil-
lion could reach Minsk in 2016, which would almost entire-
ly cover this year’s repayment to Russia.
Perspectives
By giving up on any serious economic reforms in 
favour of increasing Belarus’s external debt, Lu-
kashenko has once again proved that he is first 
and foremost a tactician, not a strategist. The 
loans from the IMF and the Eurasian Fund will be 
nothing more than an ad hoc boost to Belarus’s 
inefficient and very costly economic model, which 
is increasingly lagging behind the changing inter-
national context. A systemic reconstruction of the 
Belarusian economy over the next few years is un-
avoidable, and the current policies of the authori-
ties are only postponing it, while raising the finan-
cial and social costs of these future changes. The 
stability of Belarus’s finances, based on credit, will 
therefore be merely superficial and short-term; 
and most importantly, the Belarusian authorities 
will be unable to stop the progressive decline in 
the public’s standard of living and the further 
degradation of the mostly outdated state-owned 
industrial plants. While planning its macroeco-
nomic policy on a short-term basis, the regime 
will first and foremost be considering the mood 
of the public, especially before the parliamenta-
ry  elections scheduled for September 2016. It is 
thus hard to assume that if the aforementioned 
loans are granted, the Belarusian authorities will 
allocate these funds to finance reforms. Most like-
ly some of the money will be used to rejuvenate 
the Central Bank’s exhausted foreign exchange 
reserves, and some to cover the costs of the so-
cial aid package designed to alleviate the dissat-
isfaction of Belarus’s citizens, more and more of 
whom will be affected by the consequences of 
the economic crisis. 
